36 ideas
16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
16867 | Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege] |
16863 | Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege] |
16862 | The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege] |
16865 | 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege] |
16866 | Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege] |
16868 | The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege] |
16871 | A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege] |
16870 | Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege] |
16869 | To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege] |
16864 | If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege] |
18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
16876 | We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege] |
16875 | We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege] |
16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |