Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws)' and 'Truth-makers and dependence'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett]
Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]