18 ideas
13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |
13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |