40 ideas
| 2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
| 5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
| 2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
| 2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
| 5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
| 5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
| 5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
| 5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
| 2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
| 5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
| 5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
| 2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
| 5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
| 5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
| 5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
| 5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
| 5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
| 5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
| 5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
| 5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
| 5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
| 2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
| 2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
| 2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
| 2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
| 2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
| 2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
| 2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
| 2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
| 5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
| 2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
| 2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
| 2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
| 2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
| 2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
| 2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
| 2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
| 2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| 2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |