26 ideas
18915 | If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen] |
18919 | There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen] |
18913 | Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen] |
18907 | Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen] |
12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
18912 | Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen] |
12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
18905 | Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen] |
18922 | Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen] |
18908 | Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen] |
12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
18917 | Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen] |
18916 | Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen] |
18921 | Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen] |
14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
18918 | Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen] |
18920 | 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen] |
18906 | Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |