Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue' and 'The Boundary Stones of Thought'

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67 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt]
Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt]
A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt]
Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt]
If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt]
The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt]
If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant]
Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant]
The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant]
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant]
Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant]
Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant]
Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant]
Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant]
We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant]
Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant]
Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant]