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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Philosophy of Mathematics' and 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'

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66 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions should be replaceable by primitives, and should not be creative [Brown,JR]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Set theory says that natural numbers are an actual infinity (to accommodate their powerset) [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory assumed that there is a set for every condition [Brown,JR]
Nowadays conditions are only defined on existing sets [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The 'iterative' view says sets start with the empty set and build up [Brown,JR]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
A flock of birds is not a set, because a set cannot go anywhere [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
If a proposition is false, then its negation is true [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell]
Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Axioms are either self-evident, or stipulations, or fallible attempts [Brown,JR]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox finds a contradiction in the naming of huge numbers [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is the only place where we are sure we are right [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
'There are two apples' can be expressed logically, with no mention of numbers [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / n. Pi
π is a 'transcendental' number, because it is not the solution of an equation [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Mathematics represents the world through structurally similar models. [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
There is no limit to how many ways something can be proved in mathematics [Brown,JR]
Computers played an essential role in proving the four-colour theorem of maps [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Set theory may represent all of mathematics, without actually being mathematics [Brown,JR]
When graphs are defined set-theoretically, that won't cover unlabelled graphs [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
To see a structure in something, we must already have the idea of the structure [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Sets seem basic to mathematics, but they don't suit structuralism [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
The irrationality of root-2 was achieved by intellect, not experience [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR]
Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Empiricists base numbers on objects, Platonists base them on properties [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Does some mathematics depend entirely on notation? [Brown,JR]
For nomalists there are no numbers, only numerals [Brown,JR]
The most brilliant formalist was Hilbert [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
There are no constructions for many highly desirable results in mathematics [Brown,JR]
Constructivists say p has no value, if the value depends on Goldbach's Conjecture [Brown,JR]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
David's 'Napoleon' is about something concrete and something abstract [Brown,JR]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
'Abstract' nowadays means outside space and time, not concrete, not physical [Brown,JR]
The older sense of 'abstract' is where 'redness' or 'group' is abstracted from particulars [Brown,JR]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
A term can have not only a sense and a reference, but also a 'computational role' [Brown,JR]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Given atomism at one end, and a finite universe at the other, there are no physical infinities [Brown,JR]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell]