65 ideas
| 2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
| 2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
| 17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
| 2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
| 2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
| 10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
| 10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
| 10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
| 10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
| 10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
| 10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
| 10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
| 10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
| 10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
| 2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
| 10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
| 2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
| 10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
| 10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
| 10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
| 10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
| 10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
| 10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
| 10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
| 2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
| 2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
| 2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
| 2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
| 2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
| 2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
| 2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
| 2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
| 2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
| 2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
| 2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
| 2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
| 2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
| 2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
| 2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
| 2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
| 2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
| 2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
| 2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
| 2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
| 2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
| 2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
| 2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
| 2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
| 2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
| 2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
| 2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
| 2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
| 2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
| 2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
| 2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
| 19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
| 2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
| 2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
| 10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
| 2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |