21 ideas
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |