Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Modality' and 'The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


35 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter]
'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter]
Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]