12 ideas
| 12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
| 14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
| 6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
| 14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
| 14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
| 14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
| 6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| 14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
| 21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |