52 ideas
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
9724 | Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton] |
9703 | 'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton] |
9705 | 'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton] |
9704 | 'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton] |
9710 | We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton] |
9707 | 'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton] |
9712 | A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton] |
9713 | A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton] |
9699 | The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton] |
9700 | Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton] |
9702 | A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton] |
9701 | A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton] |
9706 | A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton] |
9708 | A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton] |
9709 | A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton] |
9711 | A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton] |
9714 | A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton] |
9717 | A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton] |
9715 | An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton] |
9716 | We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton] |
9722 | Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
9718 | Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton] |
9721 | A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton] |
9994 | A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton] |
9719 | A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton] |
9720 | A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton] |
9995 | Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton] |
9996 | Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton] |
9997 | For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
9723 | Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |