Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Individuals without Sortals' and 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
Sense-data are purely physical [Russell]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Matter is a logical construction [Russell]
Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell]