Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'How Things Might Have Been' and 'The Foundations of Mathematics'

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27 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
13430 Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
13428 Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13427 Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
13334 Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
13426 Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
13425 Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
22328 I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
22325 A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]