14 ideas
| 17824 | The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy] |
| 7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
| 17825 | Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy] |
| 17826 | Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy] |
| 17828 | Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy] |
| 17827 | Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy] |
| 17830 | Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy] |
| 17823 | If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy] |
| 17829 | Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy] |
| 7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
| 7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |