13 ideas
9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |