8 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
13639 | Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro] |
21557 | Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Quine, by Lackey] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |