Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Areopagiticus', 'Modal Logics and Philosophy' and 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?'

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35 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle]
Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle]
S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle]
Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle]
Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 5. Tableau Proof
If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle]
Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]