27 ideas
7798 | There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle] |
7786 | Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle] |
7799 | Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle] |
7797 | Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle] |
7794 | There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle] |
7793 | ◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle] |
7795 | S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle] |
7796 | Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle] |
7787 | Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle] |
7788 | Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle] |
7789 | Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle] |
7790 | If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle] |
7800 | Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle] |
7801 | Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle] |
7792 | A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |