67 ideas
22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |