Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Human Personality' and 'Philosophical Logic'

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47 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Genius and love of truth are always accompanied by great humility [Weil]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess]
It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess]
The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess]
Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess]
We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess]
We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess]
We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess]
Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess]
It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being [Weil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The mind is imprisoned and limited by language, restricting our awareness of wider thoughts [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
Beauty is an attractive mystery, leaving nothing to be desired [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Everything which originates in love is beautiful [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil is transmitted by comforts and pleasures, but mostly by doing harm to people [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
It is not more money which the wretched members of society need [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The problem of the collective is not suppression of persons, but persons erasing themselves [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights are asserted contentiously, and need the backing of force [Weil]
Giving centrality to rights stifles all impulses of charity [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The spirit of justice needs the full attention of truth, and that attention is love [Weil]
Justice (concerning harm) is distinct from rights (concerning inequality) [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
The only thing in society worse than crime is repressive justice [Weil]
Punishment aims at the good for men who don't desire it [Weil]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
The only choice is between supernatural good, or evil [Weil]