39 ideas
16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
23825 | We seek truth only because it is good [Weil] |
16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
23826 | Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil] |
23833 | The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil] |
23808 | There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil] |
23831 | The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil] |
23830 | A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil] |
23809 | Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil] |
23807 | The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil] |
23810 | Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil] |
23811 | If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil] |
23765 | The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil] |