20 ideas
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |