Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics' and 'The Moral Problem'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
11257 The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
23744 Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
11235 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
11277 Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11248 Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23743 Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
23739 Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
23724 A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
23736 A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
23723 In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
23735 Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
23738 Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
23742 If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
23746 Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23733 Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
23740 Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
23745 We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
23732 A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
23741 Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]