Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'works' and 'Laws of Nature'

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42 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Special relativity, unlike general relativity, was operationalist in spirit [Putnam on Einstein]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré]
Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics [Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré]
General relativity assumes laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference [Einstein, by Close]
Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré]
Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré]
Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré]
Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré]
Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Newton is a special case of Einstein's general theory, with an infinite speed of light [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
The theory is 'special' because it sticks to observers moving straight, at constant speeds [Einstein, by Farmelo]
Assume the speed of light is constant for all observers, and the laws of physics are the same [Einstein, by Farmelo]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
General Relativity says there is no absolute force or acceleration [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
Mass is a measure of energy content [Einstein]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space-time arises from the connection between measurements of space and of time [Einstein, by Farmelo]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
I do not believe in a personal God [Einstein]