Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Identity and Essence' and 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber]
If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber]
The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber]
'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber]