Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Letters to Frege' and 'The Logical Syntax of Language'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13342 Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski on Carnap]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
13251 Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax [Carnap]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
13365 Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
10711 Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9127 Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7658 Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7655 The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7657 Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
7656 I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
7654 What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
7531 We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]