30 ideas
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| 7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
| 7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
| 7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
| 7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |