Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'The Mysterious Flame' and 'Mathematics is Megethology'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis]
The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis]
The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis]
Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn]