17 ideas
| 2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
| 2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
| 3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
| 2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| 2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
| 3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
| 2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
| 2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
| 2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |