20 ideas
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |