10 ideas
14231 | We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins] |
14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |
14233 | Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins] |
11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |