13 ideas
3644 | Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
3621 | Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
3637 | Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes] |