8 ideas
19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |