Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Elbow Room: varieties of free will', 'Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?' and 'Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The first-order ZF axiomatisation is highly non-categorical [Hallett,M]
Non-categoricity reveals a sort of incompleteness, with sets existing that the axioms don't reveal [Hallett,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Zermelo allows ur-elements, to enable the widespread application of set-theory [Hallett,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The General Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with ZF [Hallett,M]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett]
Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]