Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Presentation of Self in Everyday Life' and 'Propositions'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9455 Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
9454 The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7658 Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
8044 Goffman sees the self as no more than a peg on which to hang roles we play [Goffman, by MacIntyre]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7655 The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7657 Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
7656 I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
7654 What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
9453 Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
9452 Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
9451 Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]