Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Elements of the Philosophy of Right' and 'The Tarskian Turn'

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104 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom emerges at the end of a process [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is exploration of the rational [Hegel]
Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Subjective and objective are not firmly opposed, but merge into one another [Hegel]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten]
Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten]
Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten]
Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten]
An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten]
'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten]
A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten]
The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten]
Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten]
By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten]
Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten]
Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten]
This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten]
Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten]
Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics
Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten]
Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Personality overcomes subjective limitations and posits Dasein as its own [Hegel]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten]
If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
It is a rejection of intellectual dignity to say that we cannot know the truth [Hegel]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
A person is a being which is aware of its own self-directed and free subjectivity [Hegel]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A human only become a somebody as a member of a social estate [Hegel]
Individuals attain their right by discovering their self-consciousness in institutions [Hegel]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The concept of the will is the free will which wills its freedom [Hegel]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Evil enters a good will when we believe we are doing right, but allow no criticism of our choice [Hegel, by Houlgate]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Conscience is the right of the self to know what is right and obligatory, and thus make them true [Hegel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is ethical life in its natural form [Hegel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Be a person, and respect other persons [Hegel]
The categorical imperative lacks roots in a historical culture [Hegel, by Bowie]
The categorical imperative is fine if you already have a set of moral principles [Hegel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The good is realised freedom [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The family is the first basis of the state, but estates are a necessary second [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
I aim to portray the state as a rational entity [Hegel]
Society draws people, and requires their work, making them wholly dependent on it [Hegel]
The state is the march of God in the world [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Individuals can't leave the state, because they are natural citizens, and humans require a state [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A fully developed state is conscious and knows what it wills [Hegel]
The people do not have the ability to know the general will [Hegel]
The great man of the ages is the one who reveals and accomplishes the will of his time [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A constitution embodies a nation's rights and condition [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Individuals must dedicate themselves to the ethical whole, and give their lives when asked [Hegel]
Social groups must focus on the state, which must in turn respect their inclusion and their will [Hegel]
People can achieve respect for their state by insight into its essence [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
In the 1840s Hegel seemed to defend society being right as it is, as a manifestation of Mind [Hegel, by Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Majority rule means obligations can be imposed on me [Hegel]
The state should reflect all interests, and not just popular will, or a popular party [Hegel, by Houlgate]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In modern states an individual's actions should be their choice [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Moral individuals become ethical when they see the social aspect of a matter [Hegel, by Houlgate]
For Hegel, the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Even educated women are unsuited to science, philosophy, art and government [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slaves have no duties because they have no rights [Hegel]
Slaves are partly responsible for their own condition [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
True liberal freedom is to pursue something, while being free to cease the pursuit [Hegel, by Houlgate]
People assume they are free, but the options available are not under their control [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Freedom requires us to submit to a family, or a corporation, or a state [Hegel, by Houlgate]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Money is the best way to achieve just equality [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights imply duties, and duties imply rights [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Man has an absolute right to appropriate things [Hegel]
Because only human beings can own property, everything else can become our property [Hegel]
A community does not have the property-owning rights that a person has [Hegel]
The owner of a thing is obviously the first person to freely take possession of it [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Wars add strength to a nation, and cure internal dissension [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Children need discipline, to break their self-will and eradicate sensuousness [Hegel]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
To have pagan beliefs and be a pagan are quite different [Hegel]
Some religions lead to harsh servitude and the debasement of human beings [Hegel]