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All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Elements of the Philosophy of Right' and 'Vagueness'

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99 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom emerges at the end of a process [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is exploration of the rational [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Subjective and objective are not firmly opposed, but merge into one another [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Personality overcomes subjective limitations and posits Dasein as its own [Hegel]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson]
Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson]
A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson]
If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson]
The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson]
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson]
Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson]
The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson]
We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson]
If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson]
You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson]
Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson]
Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson]
Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson]
Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson]
Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson]
Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
It is a rejection of intellectual dignity to say that we cannot know the truth [Hegel]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
A person is a being which is aware of its own self-directed and free subjectivity [Hegel]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A human only become a somebody as a member of a social estate [Hegel]
Individuals attain their right by discovering their self-consciousness in institutions [Hegel]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The concept of the will is the free will which wills its freedom [Hegel]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Evil enters a good will when we believe we are doing right, but allow no criticism of our choice [Hegel, by Houlgate]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Conscience is the right of the self to know what is right and obligatory, and thus make them true [Hegel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is ethical life in its natural form [Hegel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Be a person, and respect other persons [Hegel]
The categorical imperative lacks roots in a historical culture [Hegel, by Bowie]
The categorical imperative is fine if you already have a set of moral principles [Hegel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The good is realised freedom [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The family is the first basis of the state, but estates are a necessary second [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
I aim to portray the state as a rational entity [Hegel]
Society draws people, and requires their work, making them wholly dependent on it [Hegel]
The state is the march of God in the world [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Individuals can't leave the state, because they are natural citizens, and humans require a state [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A fully developed state is conscious and knows what it wills [Hegel]
The people do not have the ability to know the general will [Hegel]
The great man of the ages is the one who reveals and accomplishes the will of his time [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A constitution embodies a nation's rights and condition [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Individuals must dedicate themselves to the ethical whole, and give their lives when asked [Hegel]
Social groups must focus on the state, which must in turn respect their inclusion and their will [Hegel]
People can achieve respect for their state by insight into its essence [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
In the 1840s Hegel seemed to defend society being right as it is, as a manifestation of Mind [Hegel, by Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Majority rule means obligations can be imposed on me [Hegel]
The state should reflect all interests, and not just popular will, or a popular party [Hegel, by Houlgate]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In modern states an individual's actions should be their choice [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Moral individuals become ethical when they see the social aspect of a matter [Hegel, by Houlgate]
For Hegel, the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Even educated women are unsuited to science, philosophy, art and government [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slaves have no duties because they have no rights [Hegel]
Slaves are partly responsible for their own condition [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
True liberal freedom is to pursue something, while being free to cease the pursuit [Hegel, by Houlgate]
People assume they are free, but the options available are not under their control [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Freedom requires us to submit to a family, or a corporation, or a state [Hegel, by Houlgate]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Money is the best way to achieve just equality [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights imply duties, and duties imply rights [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Man has an absolute right to appropriate things [Hegel]
Because only human beings can own property, everything else can become our property [Hegel]
A community does not have the property-owning rights that a person has [Hegel]
The owner of a thing is obviously the first person to freely take possession of it [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Wars add strength to a nation, and cure internal dissension [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Children need discipline, to break their self-will and eradicate sensuousness [Hegel]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
To have pagan beliefs and be a pagan are quite different [Hegel]
Some religions lead to harsh servitude and the debasement of human beings [Hegel]