Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'New Essays on Human Understanding' and 'Politics'

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223 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle]
Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle]
Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz]
If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz]
Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz]
I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz]
Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz]
We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
No two things are totally identical [Leibniz]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle]
Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz]
We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz]
The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz]
Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz]
All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz]
You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz]
The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle]
We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz]
Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz]
We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz]
The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz]
The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle]
Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle]
People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The law is the mean [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle]
People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle]
Only humans have reason [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle]
A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle]
People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle]
Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle]
A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle]
A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle]
The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle]
The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle]
Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle]
A city aims at living well [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle]
A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle]
The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle]
Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle]
The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle]
Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle]
We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle]
The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle]
The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle]
The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle]
People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle]
The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle]
In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle]
Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle]
The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle]
Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle]
Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle]
Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle]
If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle]
It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle]
Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle]
Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle]
The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle]
There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle]
It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle]
We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle]
Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle]
The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle]
Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle]
The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle]
Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle]
Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle]
If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle]
It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle]
It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle]
A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle]
The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz]
Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz]
Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle]
God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz]
A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / c. Animal Souls
Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz]