Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainchildren', 'Psychophysical supervenience' and 'Mental Acts: their content and their objects'

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25 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15456 Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
8780 Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
11910 Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
2526 Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
2523 That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
2528 Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
2525 Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2527 Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
8775 A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
8776 We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2567 You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2568 Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2530 Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
2524 A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
8781 The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
8769 If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach]
2529 Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8770 'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
8771 'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
8772 We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
8773 Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
8774 The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
8778 Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
8777 If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
8779 We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]