10 ideas
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
10645 | We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH] |
10644 | A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH] |
10646 | Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH] |