37 ideas
| 17774 | Definitions make our intuitions mathematically useful [Mayberry] |
| 17773 | Proof shows that it is true, but also why it must be true [Mayberry] |
| 17795 | Set theory can't be axiomatic, because it is needed to express the very notion of axiomatisation [Mayberry] |
| 17796 | There is a semi-categorical axiomatisation of set-theory [Mayberry] |
| 17800 | The misnamed Axiom of Infinity says the natural numbers are finite in size [Mayberry] |
| 17801 | The set hierarchy doesn't rely on the dubious notion of 'generating' them [Mayberry] |
| 17803 | Limitation of size is part of the very conception of a set [Mayberry] |
| 17786 | The mainstream of modern logic sees it as a branch of mathematics [Mayberry] |
| 17788 | First-order logic only has its main theorems because it is so weak [Mayberry] |
| 17791 | Only second-order logic can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism [Mayberry] |
| 17787 | Big logic has one fixed domain, but standard logic has a domain for each interpretation [Mayberry] |
| 17790 | No Löwenheim-Skolem logic can axiomatise real analysis [Mayberry] |
| 17779 | 'Classificatory' axioms aim at revealing similarity in morphology of structures [Mayberry] |
| 17778 | Axiomatiation relies on isomorphic structures being essentially the same [Mayberry] |
| 17780 | 'Eliminatory' axioms get rid of traditional ideal and abstract objects [Mayberry] |
| 17789 | No logic which can axiomatise arithmetic can be compact or complete [Mayberry] |
| 17784 | Real numbers can be eliminated, by axiom systems for complete ordered fields [Mayberry] |
| 17782 | Greek quantities were concrete, and ratio and proportion were their science [Mayberry] |
| 17781 | Real numbers were invented, as objects, to simplify and generalise 'quantity' [Mayberry] |
| 17799 | Cantor's infinite is an absolute, of all the sets or all the ordinal numbers [Mayberry] |
| 17797 | Cantor extended the finite (rather than 'taming the infinite') [Mayberry] |
| 17775 | If proof and definition are central, then mathematics needs and possesses foundations [Mayberry] |
| 17776 | The ultimate principles and concepts of mathematics are presumed, or grasped directly [Mayberry] |
| 17777 | Foundations need concepts, definition rules, premises, and proof rules [Mayberry] |
| 17804 | Axiom theories can't give foundations for mathematics - that's using axioms to explain axioms [Mayberry] |
| 17792 | 1st-order PA is only interesting because of results which use 2nd-order PA [Mayberry] |
| 17793 | It is only 2nd-order isomorphism which suggested first-order PA completeness [Mayberry] |
| 17794 | Set theory is not just first-order ZF, because that is inadequate for mathematics [Mayberry] |
| 17802 | We don't translate mathematics into set theory, because it comes embodied in that way [Mayberry] |
| 17805 | Set theory is not just another axiomatised part of mathematics [Mayberry] |
| 17785 | Real numbers as abstracted objects are now treated as complete ordered fields [Mayberry] |
| 3986 | The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett] |
| 3987 | Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett] |
| 3984 | The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett] |
| 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
| 3983 | Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett] |
| 3985 | Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett] |