56 ideas
| 7846 | Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| 20107 | How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche] |
| 20352 | Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
| 20379 | Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche] |
| 15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
| 15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
| 15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
| 15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
| 15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
| 15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
| 15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
| 15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
| 15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
| 15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
| 15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
| 15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
| 15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
| 15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
| 15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
| 15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
| 15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
| 15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
| 15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
| 15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
| 15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
| 15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
| 15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
| 20123 | First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche] |
| 20105 | Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche] |
| 20376 | We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche] |
| 15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
| 15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
| 15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
| 15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
| 15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
| 3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
| 3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
| 22501 | Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 22500 | Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche] |
| 20128 | Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter] |
| 22503 | Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 8041 | The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche] |
| 20135 | Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter] |
| 20353 | The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
| 20113 | Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche] |
| 22475 | Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 22476 | Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 20104 | Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche] |
| 7847 | Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| 9782 | Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek] |
| 20102 | Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche] |
| 20106 | Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski] |
| 20124 | Reliving life countless times - this gives the value back to life which religion took away [Nietzsche] |
| 20367 | Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche] |
| 20371 | Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson] |
| 20108 | Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche] |