Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'On What Grounds What' and 'Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3158 Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
3159 Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
3785 You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
3786 Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3784 Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
3782 Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
3787 Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
3783 How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover]