39 ideas
| 8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
| 2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
| 8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
| 2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
| 2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
| 2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
| 2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
| 2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
| 8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
| 2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
| 2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
| 2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
| 2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
| 2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
| 2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
| 2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
| 8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
| 2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
| 2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
| 2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
| 2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
| 2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
| 2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
| 8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
| 8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
| 8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
| 8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
| 2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
| 2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
| 2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
| 2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
| 8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
| 2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
| 8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
| 2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
| 8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
| 3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
| 2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
| 3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |