Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference' and 'Persistence, Change and Explanation'

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15 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger]
Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger]
If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]