Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sweet Dreams', 'Ontology and Mathematical Truth' and 'Epistemology Naturalized'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien]
How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien]
Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine]
Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine]
Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]