Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology', 'Without Immediate Justification' and 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8893 For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
8888 The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
8887 It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
8897 The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8851 Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8849 Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8896 Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
8853 Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8855 Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8891 My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
8892 Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
8894 Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8889 Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
8890 If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8852 In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
8895 If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3158 Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
3159 Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]