37 ideas
| 1642 | We must fight fiercely for knowledge, understanding and intelligence [Plato] |
| 1645 | The desire to split everything into its parts is unpleasant and unphilosophical [Plato] |
| 287 | Good analysis involves dividing things into appropriate forms without confusion [Plato] |
| 1644 | Dialectic should only be taught to those who already philosophise well [Plato] |
| 20478 | In discussion a person's opinions are shown to be in conflict, leading to calm self-criticism [Plato] |
| 11278 | What does 'that which is not' refer to? [Plato] |
| 1643 | If statements about non-existence are logically puzzling, so are statements about existence [Plato] |
| 7022 | To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato] |
| 22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
| 1641 | Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato] |
| 10784 | Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato] |
| 16122 | Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato] |
| 10422 | The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato] |
| 15855 | If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it [Plato] |
| 22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
| 22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
| 22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
| 22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
| 22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
| 22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
| 22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
| 22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
| 22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
| 22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
| 22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
| 22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
| 7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
| 1637 | A soul without understanding is ugly [Plato] |
| 3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
| 3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
| 22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
| 18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
| 22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
| 18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
| 22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
| 1636 | Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato] |
| 1638 | Didactic education is hard work and achieves little [Plato] |