Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Kinds of Minds', 'Mirror Mirror - Is That All?' and 'Meaning'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
9327 Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
9325 In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
9326 Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
4608 Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4880 Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
9319 Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
9320 Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
9321 Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
9322 Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
4873 What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
4881 Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
4875 We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
4879 There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4876 Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4878 The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
4874 The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
4882 Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
7751 Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
7752 Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
7753 We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
4872 Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
4877 Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett]
9324 From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick]